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Summery
　Recently the retrieval of civic republicanism has attracted much attention. 
By liberal theorists, who occupy a position of public philosophy in liberal 
democracies, it has often been classified into two versions so that one can 
be approved and the other refused. The aim of this paper is to clarify the 
viewpoint and intent behind this liberal classification of republicanism, by 
reviewing John Rawlsʼ theory and tracking it back to Isaiah Berlinʼs. I will 
conclude that the liberal viewpoint is set so as to test whether republicanism 
is compatible with a condition of value-pluralism and that their intent is one 
that would accommodate it within the liberal framework. Finally I make 
some comments on this classification from the republican viewpoint and 
explain how far the republican division of republicanism goes beyond the 
liberal framework.(1)
１. Retrieval of civic republicanism
　Recently the retrieval of civic republicanism has attracted much 
attention.(2) This strand of political thought has a long history: it originated 
⑴　The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10th meeting of the Research 
Exchange between Peking University Law School and Okayama University, Faculty of 
Law on March 16th, 2012, in Beijing. I appreciate valuable comments by Professor Gan 
Chaoyin, Professor Zhan Zhong Le and Associate Professor Satoshi Agatsuma.
⑵　Too many literatures on republicanism have been published since Hans Baronʼs and 
John Pocockʼs memorial works (Baron 1966, Pocock 1975), so I cannot take them up 
here. For your information, I cite, as one of the most helpful introduction to 
republicanism, Honohan 2002. As references to this paper, see also Pettit 1997, 
Skinner 1998, Spitz 1995, Sandel 1996, Oldfield 1990, Michelman 1988 and Sunstein 
1988.
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in the thoughts of philosophers and historians in ancient Greek and Rome, 
like Aristotle and Cicero, and was inherited by civic humanists in the 
Renaissance period, like Machiavelli, by political theorists in the English 
Revolution, like James Harrington and by Federalists in the ratification of 
the Constitution of U.S., like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. It is 
surely the traditional political thought in Western countries, but in these 
days it has been appraised, not merely as the historical heritage, but also 
as a promising recipe for retrieving a loyalty to fatherland or public spirit in 
those countries, where people are too anomic and apathetic: the crime rate 
remains high or voter turnout low. It is regarded as an attempt to 
reconstruct the common good, shared end, or res publica, in the modern 
societies. This trend doesnʼt seem to be unrelated to the other countries, 
like China and Japan.
　Civic republicanism, often confused with communitarianism,(3) has a 
variety of dimensions and many layers of implications accumulated in the 
long history, so is difficult to capture. It is not objectionable, however, to 
sum up this political thought as claiming the following three points.
①Liberty as self-government
　People can be free, not when they are only protected from interference 
or intervention by government, but when they can decide on a social 
framework within which they live by their own hands, for example, by 
taking part in public forum, discussing on their common issues, and making 
a consensus on them.
②Cultivation of civic virtue
　People must, not claim their own private interests, but learn to assume 
public spirit enough to devote themselves to their community as a whole. 
⑶　I differentiate republicanism from communitarianism. I cannot discuss here on this 
but just point out a general tendency that the former is likely to connect with 
deliberative democracy and the latter is with perfectionalism. In the words that I use 
in the final section, the participating-deliberation version corresponds to republicanism 
with deliberative democracy, while the cultivating-virtue version to republicanism with 
perfectionalism, say communitarianism. I state there that the former is more adequate 
version of republicanism than the latter.
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Community, in turn, must take a variety of educative measures in order to 
instill this disposition in its members.
③Participating in deliberation
　People have to take part in political forum, express their opinions and 
perspectives, discuss each other and make public decisions through 
dialogues and communications, in order to determine their common affairs 
by themselves.
　Certainly, it is not deniable that civic republicanism has unacceptable 
aspects in the modern world, for it has an origin and a long history before 
the Age of Enlightenment. It has a notorious reputation that it has 
conventionally sustained the hierarchy, the slavery, the compulsory 
imposition of a single religious doctrine, wars of invasion and so on. It is 
said to maintain the existence of the lower class that is occupied with 
housework in order that citizens can have afford to engage in political 
activities. It might force its members to convert their own faiths and 
submit to a particular religious sect so as to make them sacrifice their lives 
to community. Furthermore, it would not deny military invasions of foreign 
countries for their territories or resources. In these senses, it poses a risk 
of conflicting with the ideals that we now value: equality, toleration and 
peace.
　Then it is important to see whether civic republicanism is likely to 
contradict the important values in our modern societies. In this context, 
mainly liberal theorists, who occupy a position of public philosophy in the 
modern world, attempt to classify republicanism so as to sort the 
compatible version out of it. Put another way: for republican thought has 
both a good aspect of retrieving public spirit and bad one of conflicting with 
our ideals, we should pick up the former and cast off the latter. But here is 
my doubt: Donʼt they have any intent in this attempt to accommodate a 
republican aspiration within the liberal framework? Would republicans come 
to term with or go beyond that framework? This is the theme that I explore 
in this paper.
　In this paper I will make clear the liberal viewpoint and its intent behind 
the classification of republicanism, and make some comments on it, in turn, 
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from the republican viewpoint. Let me explain the plot of this paper. In the 
following sect.2 I introduce the classification of republicanism that liberal 
theorists have recently made. In the sect.3 I make clear the liberal 
viewpoint behind this classification by focusing on John Rawlsʼ Political 
Liberalism. In the sect.4 I extract the intent of it by tracking back to Isaiah 
Berlinʼs Two Concepts of Liberty. In the last sect.5 I make some remarks 
on the liberal classification from the republican viewpoint.
２. Liberal classification of republicanism: strong and moderate
　Civic republicanism is often classified into two versions in many liberal 
literatures. Here I pick up only three cases among them:
Alan Patten: civic humanism and instrumental republicanism
　One kind of objection draws upon the republican or civic humanist 
tradition in political thought to argue that liberalismʼs main error lies in 
its narrow commitment to the ideal of negative liberty. Although 
republicans are not necessarily hostile to negative liberty, they are often 
read as recommending other important ideals as well, such as civic 
friendship, shared understandings, self-government and participation with 
others in the political affairs of oneʼs community. To reinstate the proper 
value of community and public service, on this view, it is important to 
look beyond liberty to these and other goods...
　...[T]he republican tradition, on this reading, takes issue instead with 
the idea that negative liberty can be divorced from a commitment to 
public service and citizenship. Active citizenship, these revisionist 
republicans argue, should be valued, not necessarily because it is good in 
itself, but because it contributes to the maintenance of a free society. I 
shall call this view instrumental republicanism, both to distinguish it 
from other views that are influenced by the republican tradition, and to 
emphasize its distinctive feature, which is the claim that citizenship and 
public service are goods because they contribute to the realization of 
negative liberty.(4)
⑷　Patten 1996, pp. 25-26.
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Wil Kymlicka: Aristotelian and instrumental interpretation
　To oversimplify, we can say there are two camps within contemporary 
civic republicanism. One camp tries to persuade people to accept the 
burdens of democratic citizenship by persuading them that these are not 
in fact ʻburdensʼ. The activities of political participation and public 
deliberation, on this view, should not be seen as a burdensome obligation 
or duty, but rather as intrinsically rewarding. People should happily 
embrace the call of democratic citizenship because the life of an active 
citizen is indeed the highest life available to us. We can call this the 
‘Aristotelian’ interpretation of republicanism... In any event, this view 
about the value of political participation is difficult to accept. As even its 
proponents admit, this view is markedly at odds with the way most 
people in the modern world understand the good life. Most people find the 
greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in 
politics. Some people find political participation fulfilling and satisfying, 
but for most people, it is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, 
activity needed to ensure that government respects and supports their 
freedom to pursue these personal occupations and attachments...So 
liberals will offer a different, more modest and more instrumental, 
account of civic virtue. On this account, it is accepted that people will 
have differing views about the intrinsic value of political participation, and 
that some people will find their greatest joys and projects in other areas 
of life, including the family, work, the arts, or religion. A liberal 
democracy must respect such diverse conceptions of the good life, as far 
as possible, and should not compel people to adopt a conception of the 
good life which privileges political participation as the source of meaning 
or satisfaction.(5)
⑸　Kymlicka 2002, pp. 294-302.
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David Held: developmental and protective republicanism
　In fact, two strands of republicanism can clearly be distinguished for 
analytical purposes, strands which have been referred to as ʻcivic 
humanist republicanismʼ and ʻcivicʼ or ʻclassical republicanismʼ (see 
Skinner, 1986), but which I shall refer to as ʻdevelopmentalʼ and ʻprotectiveʼ 
republicanism...developmental theorists stress the intrinsic value of 
political participation for the development of citizens as human beings, 
while protective theorists stress its instrumental importance for the 
protection of citizensʼ aims and objectives, i.e. their personal liberty... 
Principle(s) of justification [of developmental republicanism is that p]
olitical participation is an essential condition of personal liberty; if citizens 
do not rule themselves, they will be dominated by others...[Principle(s) 
of justification of protective republicanism is that c]itizens must enjoy 
political and economic equality in order that nobody can be master of 
another and all can enjoy equal freedom and development in the process 
of self-determination for the common good.(6)
　These classifications, though each naming may be different, can be said 
to have a meaning of the same sort: republicans agree to value primarily 
political participation and civic virtue, but differ on how to value them. One 
camp of republicans think that citizens have to take direct part in politics of 
their community and their community in turn has to cultivate virtues for its 
members, depending on the Aristotleʼs doctrine ʻman is by nature a political 
animal.ʼ This camp has a view originated in ancient Greek, modeled on 
democratic city-states like Athena. It is characterized by the intrinsic value 
of participation and virtue ― they are important, not because they serve to 
some other ends, but because they are themselves important; one can grow 
up a virtuous man when he takes part in politics in his own community. In 
this paper I shall call this strand as ʻstrongʼ version of republicanism, 
including in this camp Pattenʼs civic humanism, Kymlickaʼs Aristotelian and 
Heldʼs developmental republicanism.(7) I call strong because this version has 
a rigid and uncompromising claim that participation and virtue are the 
⑹　Held 1996, pp. 44-62.
⑺　I exemplify, as other critics point out, Adrian Oldfield and Michael Sandel in this 
camp. They tend to be hostile to liberals. See Sandel 1996 and Oldfield 1990.
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privileged political values among others.
　The other camp of republicans think that citizens have to participate in 
politics and their community has to cultivate virtue, but to the extent which 
these serve to maintain individual basic rights and the constitutional 
institutions which protect them, without depending on the Aristotleʼs 
doctrine. This camp has a view originated in ancient Rome, led by 
philosophers and historians like Cicero and Sallustius. It is characterized by 
the instrumental value of participation and virtue ― they are important, not 
because they are themselves important, but because they serve to other 
ends, including protection of individual rights; one would lose their own 
liberty unless he contributes to support, by civic-minded participation, the 
subsistence of the constitutional institutions which protect it. In this paper 
I shall call this strand as ʻmoderateʼ version of republicanism, including in 
this camp Pattenʼs and Kymlickaʼs instrumental and Heldʼs protective 
republicanism.(8) I call moderate because this version has a soft and 
temperate claim that participation and virtue are important just as long as 
necessary.
　The problem here is why civic republicanism should be classified in this 
way. Republicans themselves may not think that they are divided in 
different camps. If republicanism were regarded as an undividable camp, 
whether criticized or not, it would be appraised or refused as a whole in any 
way. It is unclear why these liberal theorists differentiate one camp from 
the other. As long as I know, this way of differentiation isnʼt found generally 
in other cases of political thoughts, such as feminism or multiculturalism. 
Then why only republicanism should be classified? We must stop here and 
think about a general meaning of classification: A classification seems to 
mean that we relocate into some independent categories those different 
elements which are themselves inseparable and intimately entangled when 
we find some heterogeneous features among these elements. Note ʻwhen we 
find some heterogeneous features among these elements.ʼ When we classify 
something, we previously ʻfind some heterogeneous featuresʼ in it. That is, 
a classification presupposes a certain viewpoint to find one feature strange, 
⑻　I exemplify, though other critics may disagree, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli 
in this camp. They seem to compromise somewhat with liberals, and liberals would be 
ready to accept their theories. See Skinner 1998 and Viroli 2002.
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which forces us to divide them. In other words, it implies that there is a 
normative viewpoint behind it, which directs us to pick up a good one and 
cast off a bad one. Then in the case of republicanism, what kind of 
viewpoint is behind? In the next section, I proceed to explore implications 
of the classification, by focusing on a theory of justice offered by one of the 
most famous liberal theorists.
３. Liberal viewpoint of the classification found in Rawls’ theory
　John Rawls, in his Political Liberalism (1993), also classified civic 
republicanism just as many other liberal theorists do. The passage is rather 
long, but I cite it here to explore its implications in more detail.
John Rawls: classical republicanism and civic humanism
　Classical republicanism I take to be the view that if the citizens of a 
democratic society are to preserve their basic rights and liberties, 
including the civil liberties which secure the freedoms of private life, they 
must also have to a sufficient degree the “political virtues” (as I have 
called them) and be willing to take part in public life. The idea is that 
without a widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigorous 
and informed citizen body, and certainly with a general retreat into 
private life, even the most well-designed political institutions will fall into 
the hands of those who seek to dominate and impose their will through the 
state apparatus either for the sake of power and military glory, or for 
reasons of class and economic interest, not to mention expansionist 
religious fervor and nationalist fanaticism. The safety of democratic 
liberties requires the active participation of citizens who possess the 
political virtues needed to maintain a constitutional regime. With classical 
republicanism so understood, justice as fairness as a form of political 
liberalism has no fundamental opposition. At most there can be certain 
differences on matters of institutional design and the political sociology of 
democratic regimes. These differences, if there be such, are not by any 
means trivial; they can be extremely important. But there is no fundamental 
opposition because classical republicanism does not presuppose a 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine. Nothing in 
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classical republicanism, as characterized above, is incompatible with 
political liberalism as I have described it.
　But with civic humanism, as I understand it, there is indeed 
fundamental opposition. For as a form of Aristotelianism, it is sometimes 
stated as the view that man is a social, even a political, animal whose 
essential nature is most fully realized in a democratic society in which 
there is widespread and vigorous participation in political life. 
Participation is not encouraged as necessary for the protection of the basic 
liberties of democratic citizenship, and as in itself one form of good among 
others, however important for many persons. Rather, taking part in 
democratic politics is seen as the privileged locus of the good life. It is a 
return to giving a central place to what Constant called the “liberties of the 
ancients” and has all the defects of that.(9)
　These passages clearly provide another example of the classification that 
liberal theorists make, and two versions of republicanism into which he 
classified almost completely correspond to what I called strong and moderate 
republicanism: civic humanism is strong and classical republicanism is 
moderate. What Rawls meant in these passages is also clear: classical 
republicanism is consistent with his political liberalism but civic humanism 
is not. The former is consistent because it certainly values participation and 
virtue but as long as they support “[t]he safety of democratic liberties” and 
“maintain a constitutional regime.” On the other hands, the latter is not 
consistent because it approves the intrinsic value of participation and virtue. 
In other words, it regards participation and virtue as the most important 
good life of all citizens, not as one of diverse lives that people endorse and 
pursue. In the Rawlsʼ terminology, it is not consistent because it presupposes 
a particular “comprehensive doctrine.” What is then a comprehensive 
doctrine? In order to see what it means, we have to expand our views on 
his whole project of political liberalism.
　It is very important for his project to separate the political conception of 
justice from comprehensive doctrine. His differentiation of republicanism 
can be thought as a particular case of this general separation in his project. 
⑼　Rawls 1993, pp. 205-206 (emphasis added).
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He meant by “comprehensive doctrine” one that teaches a wide range of 
affairs, covering a good life or a world view. It includes, for example, a 
moral doctrine which teach us how to live or a religious doctrine which 
explains how God created our world. All citizens commit to their own 
particular comprehensive doctrines, whether they consciously endorsed or 
not. So there is a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in our 
societies, and this fact is “a permanent feature of the public culture of 
democracy.”(10) On the other hands, the political conception of justice is 
freestanding from these comprehensive doctrines and so it doesnʼt instruct 
any good life or world view in itself. Rather it is said only to express the 
“fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture” and even 
if citizens commit to their own comprehensive doctrines, its content “is at 
least familiar and intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens 
generally.”(11) Therefore the political conception of justice is completely 
neutral to all comprehensive doctrines, because it is independent of them 
and just expresses the shared ideas in the political culture. It would never 
favor or disfavor them.
　Note here that there is a curious and interesting relation between the 
political conception of justice and comprehensive doctrines. The former is 
surely freestanding from the latters. But according to Rawls, even if a 
reasonable diversity of the comprehensive doctrines is given, the political 
conception of justice is nevertheless agreed to by citizens who commit to 
them.(12) All citizens may commit to their different comprehensive 
doctrines, but at the same time they can agree to the political conception of 
justice on each reason which derives from each doctrine ― for example, 
⑽　Rawls 1993, p. 36.“This pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural 
outcome of the activities of human reason.” See also Rawls 1993, p. xxvi.
⑾　Rawls 1993, pp. 13-14.
⑿　“Now if all citizens are freely to endorse the political conception of justice, that 
conception must be able to gain the support of citizens who affirm different and 
opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines, in which case we have an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines....We model this by putting peopleʼs 
comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance. This enables us to find a political 
conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby 
serve as a public basis of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.” Rawls 1993, p. 24-25 note.
A Testing Ground to See Whether Pluralist or Not: Can Republicans be tamed?
10
611
???
those who belong to a sect of Christianity can agree on a reason of freedom 
of faith or those who endorse moral philosophy of Mill or Kant on a reason 
of the principle of toleration. What kind of reason they rely on is completely 
ignored. But the political conception of justice can have support of reasons 
derived from each comprehensive doctrine. Rawls call this “an overlapping 
consensus.” It is not just a temporary and unstable product of compromise 
among citizens who commit to opposing doctrines, like modus vivendi, but 
a permanent and stable basis of the public justification rooted in each 
doctrine. The political conception “rests on the totality of reasons specified 
within the comprehensive doctrine affirmed by each citizen.”(13)
　Then why should the political conception of justice be agreed to by 
citizens who commit to their comprehensive doctrines, though it is said to 
be freestanding from them? The reason can be traced to a main issue that 
Rawls tried to answer in Political Liberalism: what I call the problem of ʻthe 
stable unification of the pluralist society.ʼ He declared at the beginning of his 
book: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”(14) This 
statement can be analyzed as follows: it is a given fact that there is a 
diversity of incommensurable and even opposing though reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines in our modern society. Rawls called this “the fact 
of reasonable pluralism.” But in spite of this fact, it is still possible to realize 
an ideal of the well-ordered society where free and equal citizens, who 
endorse different doctrines, can cooperate and respect without conflicting 
each other. Put another way: the aim of political liberalism is set for 
organizing the constitutional regime in which citizens can freely endorse and 
pursue their own comprehensive doctrines and their conceptions of the 
good, even if they oppose each other. This can be said the primary 
question of political liberalism.
　By tracing back to his main issue, we come to be able to understand 
what Rawls meant by differentiating the political conception of justice from 
comprehensive doctrine. We now see that Rawls required this differentiation 
⒀　Rawls 1993, pp. 168-171.
⒁　Rawls 1993, p. xx.
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because he tried to make an outline of a social framework in which citizens 
can endorse and pursue their own conception of the good given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. In this outline, comprehensive doctrine should be 
disqualified as a basis of the public justification in the pluralist society 
because it privileges a particular conception of the good and therefore would 
deny the other conceptions if it held a public position. The public basis 
should be the political conception of justice because it is freestanding from, 
therefore neutral to, all comprehensive doctrines and at the same time is 
supported by citizens on each reason derived from their doctrines. It must 
be the political conception of justice, not comprehensive doctrine, that gives 
a key to solve the problem of the stable unification of the pluralist society.
　Now letʼs get back to the classification of republicanism. The classification 
can be said a corollary of this Rawlsʼ approach to the problem and a 
particular case of this general separation. Generally, if any thought 
presupposes a particular comprehensive doctrine, it must be refused in the 
pluralist society. If not, it can be endorsed unless its content is 
contradictory to the political conception of justice. Letʼs apply this general 
approach to a particular case of republicanism. If republicans have a strong 
claim that participation and virtue are the most important good for all 
citizens, their claim must be denied because it presupposes a particular 
comprehensive doctrine. But if they have a more moderate claim that 
participation and virtue are only means to preserve democratic liberties, it 
can be acceptable because, according to Rawls, it doesnʼt contradict his 
political conception of justice. In this way the criterion of how to classify 
republicanism is, as we have noted, the compatibility with the project of 
political liberalism to unite the pluralist society.
　By focusing on the Rawlsʼ project of political liberalism and tracing back 
to his primary issue, we can now infer the liberal viewpoint in general. 
Liberal theorists, it seems, tend to rely on a separation between the right 
and the good, or the public and the private, when they try to find out some 
principle to organize a pluralist society.(15) In other words, they tend to 
ʻsanctifyʼ the private sphere from interference by government in order to 
⒂　I am not confident to say that all liberals relied on such a separation, but it is well 
known that Sandel criticized Rawls, as the most typical liberal, for the priority of the 
right over the good. See Sandel 1998b, pp. 184-218.
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allow individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good, whereas they 
urge governmental power to realize the conception of justice that specifies 
individual rights or distribution of the goods. It may be possible to say that 
Rawlsʼ differentiation between the political and the comprehensive is parallel 
to the liberal separation between the public and the private in general. So it 
isnʼt surprising that liberal theorists like Rawls introduced this separation 
when they judged a validity of republicanism. On this separation, according 
to them, republicanism must be judged: it should be accepted if it is 
consistent to their public conception of justice but if not, it must be refused. 
In sum, the viewpoint whether republicanism is acceptable or not is, it 
seems, the compatibility with the liberal conception of justice. Isnʼt it this 
viewpoint that was behind when liberal theorists made the classification of 
republicanism?
　The classification from this viewpoint, though current in recent literatures, 
doesnʼt have its origin in Rawlsʼ political liberalism. We can track it back to 
a great ancestor, who has influenced many liberals for a long time. Further 
exploration will lead us to clarify the intent behind the classification.
４. Liberal intent behind the classification hidden in Berlin’s theory
　Isaiah Berlin published his famous article, Two Concepts of Liberty in 
1958, prior to Rawlsʼ Political liberalism in 1993. Since then, this article has 
been, whether supported or criticized, the basic reference for the after-war 
dispute on liberty and one of the most influential literature in legal and 
political philosophy. In this article, as is well known, Berlin laid out two 
different ― negative and positive ― conceptions of liberty.
　The negative conception of liberty, on the one hand, means that one is 
free when he is relieved of any interference or not intervened by anyone.(16) 
It has been supported by J. Locke, J.S. Mill, B. Constant or A. de 
Tocqueville and so clearly connected to modern liberalism.(17) The positive 
conception of liberty, on the other hand, means that one is free when he is 
willing to take part in the decision-making on his own life.(18) It has been, 
according to Berlin, “at the heart of many of the nationalist, Communist, 
⒃　Berlin 1969, pp. 168-169.
⒄　Berlin 1969, pp. 171-175.
⒅　Berlin 1969, p. 178.
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authoritarian, and totalitarian creeds of our day.”(19) But if it can be called 
a liberty as self-government, we may connect this conception of liberty to 
civic republicanism.
　After he had explained the two conceptions of liberty, he supported 
negative rather than positive liberty in his conclusion. The conclusion 
derived from the following single-track reasoning:
1) The positive interpretation of liberty necessarily leads to metaphysical 
monism.
2) But metaphysical monism is not consistent with our modern pluralist 
society.
3) So we have to interpret the concept of liberty only in the negative 
sense.
I explain this reasoning in order:
1) According to Berlin, the positive interpretation of liberty would always 
arrive at the same conclusion. It begins with a claim that when we live with 
our naked desires, we are slaves of them. It proceeds to claim that we are 
free when we live rationally with the ʻtrueʼ desires, that is, when we are 
subject to the substantive code of behaviors or the objective rule of affairs. 
But we donʼt know what it is and irrationally live ʻwrongʼ lives, so we have 
to listen to the other person who knows well about it. At last appears 
metaphysical monism: it is a destination of positive liberty that we are 
obliged to be dependent on, therefore subordinated to, a single moral 
subject who would know the absolute truth of just behaviors beyond our 
world of concrete and contingent affairs.
2) However, metaphysical monism clearly contradicts a condition of our 
modern society. We live in a society in which there is no common good so 
that we have different and mutually incommensurable values and ends. If 
government or ʻthe moral agentʼ forced us to accept a single value and end, 
our society would take the road to serfdom: totalitarianism. It would deny 
liberty itself by compelling us to abandon our own values and ends.
3) This is why liberty should be interpreted in the negative, not positive, 
⒆　Berlin 1969, pp. 190-201.
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sense. Surely interpreting liberty in the negative sense is not the best way. 
It has some problems: firstly, it cannot recognize a miserable condition like 
poverty as interference of liberty. Even if someone is put in an extreme 
poverty, as long as he isnʼt intervened to do what he wants to do, he would 
still be regarded as completely free. Secondly, it is consistent with any form 
of political regime. It is not necessarily connected with democratic 
government. It would be protected, as long as the private spheres arenʼt 
intervened, even under tyranny.(20) However, in spite of these problems, 
Berlin emphasized that the risks of negative liberty were less than those of 
positive liberty, that is, totalitarianism.(21) He justified, as it were, 
negative liberty on the reason of its comparative merit against the 
background of the supposed worst consequence from positive liberty.
　Note here the risks that Berlin attributed to positive liberty. 1) specifies 
that if we adopt the interpretation of liberty in the positive sense, as self-
government, it will necessarily lead to metaphysical monism. This idea 
would bring totalitarian society where government in place of the moral 
agency would deny our own values and ends and force us to accept the 
single common good. In this scheme, the positive conception of liberty is 
perhaps supposed to involve a claim that participation and virtue are the 
common good which all citizens must accept and other conceptions of the 
good should be denied. If so, it contradicts a condition of our pluralist 
society because it would not leave room for a diversity of the conceptions of 
the good which people endorse and pursue. In sum, Berlin thought that the 
positive conception of liberty should be refused because it would deny value-
pluralism.
　The criterion to decide whether a certain theory of liberty should be 
permissible or not is, for Berlin, one that it would approve value-pluralism: 
he would accept a conception of liberty when it would leave room for a 
diversity of the conceptions of the good. But otherwise, he would not. The 
negative interpretation of liberty is supposed to have its comparative merit 
because it presupposes value-pluralism. In contrast, the positive interpretation 
should be refused because it would deny value-pluralism. It seems plausible 
⒇　Berlin 1969 pp. 175-178.
　Spitz 1995, p. 94.
岡　法（62―３)
15
606
???
to say that he used a kind of a litmus test: whether theory of liberty is 
pluralist or not? We have explored a viewpoint behind the liberal 
classification of republicanism in the section 3: republicanism is acceptable 
when it would be compatible with the liberal theory of justice, while it is 
denied when it would not. Isnʼt the viewpoint consonant to this Berlinʼs 
test?
　There is certainly a distance between Berlinʼs and liberal theoristsʼ like 
Rawlsʼ position. The liberal classification gets across republicanism itself, 
that is, separates it into two versions. It is a difference, in its own terms, 
between two positions within republicanism. To the contrary, Berlinʼs 
dichotomy is not for judging a validity of republicanism. It is a difference 
between two conceptions of liberty: negative liberty is supposed to be 
connected with liberalism, while positive liberty is not, by definition, even 
concerned to republicanism. The supporters of positive liberty were not 
republicans, but “the nationalist, Communist, authoritarian, and totalitarian” 
as Berlin exemplified. Republicans have certainly advocated an importance 
of self-government, but a relation between republicanism and positive 
liberty is not so direct.
　In order to explore how Berlin would see republicanism, letʼs introduce 
an analysis of his theory by Crawford B. Macpherson. According to it, 
Berlinʼs understanding of positive liberty includes three meanings of political 
liberty: ①self-direction or self-mastery, ②coercion by the fully-rational or 
by those who have attained self-mastery and ③a share in the controlling 
authority. Berlin thought that ①self-mastery would necessarily lead to ②
coercion, but this transition was based only on an unsustainable supposition 
by rationalist that there is a “single true solution.”(22) If a connection 
between ①self-mastery and ②coercion is not necessary as Macpherson 
said, Berlinʼs degradation of positive liberty cannot hold true thoroughly of 
republicanism, which valued only ①self-mastery, not ②coercion. Then we 
should say that it holds true only of a particular version of republicanism, 
which connects ①self-mastery with ②coercion. Put another way: in the 
Berlinʼs view, if republicans approve ②coercion by the fully-rational, they 
would be degraded as supporting a strong version because it would 
　Macpherson 1973, pp. 95-119.
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necessarily lead to metaphysical monism.
　Then if republicans donʼt approve ②coercion, how would Berlin judge a 
version which they support? To see this point, we must put it together with 
his understanding of Niccolò Machiavelli. For modern republicans, he was 
a great successor of classical republicanism in the Renaissance and is seen 
as an enemy of liberalism or pluralism. But in the Berlinʼs view Machiavelli 
was the first value-pluralist in the history of western political thought. He 
was the first writer who differentiated a moral world into two incompatible 
moralities ― one is the morality of the pagan world and another is the 
morality of Christianity.(23) By this differentiation, he challenged ＂one of the 
foundations of the central western philosophical tradition, the belief in the 
ultimate compatibility of all genuine values.”(24) He didnʼt wholly intended to 
bring such an effect, but a certain consequence would follow from his 
political philosophy: ＂ends equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict 
each other, that entire systems of value may come into collision without 
possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional 
circumstances, as a result of abnormality or accident or error...but (this 
was surely new) as part of the normal human situation.＂(25) His philosophy 
didnʼt allow people anymore to live comfortably and harmoniously in a single 
moral world, since the incompatible moralities eternally existed and this fact 
couldnʼt be avoided. And Berlin judged Machiavelliʼs contribution to modern 
political philosophy as follows,
　This was a major turning point, and its intellectual consequences, wholly 
unintended by its originator, were, by a fortunate irony of history (which some 
call its dialectic), the bases of the very liberalism that Machiavelli would surely 
have condemned as feeble and characterless, lacking in single-minded pursuit of 
power, in splendour, in organisation, in virtù, in power to discipline unruly men 
　According to Berlin, in the morality of the pagan world, vigor, fortitude in 
adversity, public achievement, order, discipline, happiness, strength, and justice were 
valued, while in the morality of Christianity, charity, mercy, sacrifice, love of God, 
forgiveness of enemies, contempt for the goods of this world, faith in the life hereafter, 
and belief in the salvation of the individual soul were counted as the supreme ideals. 
Berlin 1971, pp. 45-46.
　Berlin 1971, p. 71.
　Berlin 1971, pp. 74-75.
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against huge odds into one energetic whole. Yet he is, in spite of himself, one of 
the makers of pluralism, and of its ― to him ― perilous acceptance of toleration.(26)
　According to Berlin, Machiavelli was the very originator of pluralism and 
liberalism, even though he himself wasnʼt aware of that. What he advocated 
was that moral world is plural and diverse, not single and unitary. In this 
way Berlin understood that Machiavelli was one of value-pluralists, even 
liberal. If Machiavelli himself was appraised as one of value-pluralists, 
republicans, who take over his heritage, would also be appraised as 
favorable by Berlin. They would also be accepted at least as quasi-pluralists 
or quasi-liberals in the same way neo-roman theorists are appraised by 
Quentin Skinner. In sum, republicanism, if it has taken over Machiavelliʼs 
philosophy, can be approved as a moderate version which can be compatible 
with value- pluralism.
　By putting together Berlinʼs dichotomy of liberty with his understanding 
of Machiavelli, it can be said that he would correspond to republicanism just 
as liberals like Rawls do. Their correspondence to republicans, as it were, 
has a coincidence. In the eyes of Berlin, if republicanism is connected to the 
positive conception of liberty, particularly ②coercion as Macpherson 
analyzed, it would be refused as leading metaphysical monism and 
totalitarianism. This is the very reason Rawls rejected civic humanism: it 
would presuppose a particular comprehensive doctrine and therefore 
contradict value-pluralism. On the other hand, if republicanism is a 
derivation from Machiavelliʼs pluralist philosophy, it would be accepted. 
This is also dependent on the same reason Rawls approved classical 
republicanism: it would be consistent with his political conception of justice 
and therefore accommodated within it.(27) In this way, Berlin and liberals 
like Rawls seem to converge on a point that they judge a validity of 
republicanism by the compatibility with value-pluralism. Certainly Berlinʼs 
dichotomy of liberty appeared more rigid and stubborn perhaps against the 
political background of the Cold War at that time, while Rawlsʼ 
　Berlin 1971, p. 79.
　When Rawls classified republicanism, he put Machiavelli into classical republicans, 
who are consistent with his political liberalism, and preferred him to Arendt, who was 
put into civic humanists. See Rawls 1993, pp. 205-206. n. 37.
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differentiation of republicanism looked more tolerate and benevolent since 
liberals occupied a position of public philosophy in liberal democracies. 
However, it cannot be denied that the liberal viewpoint behind the 
classification of republicanism is consonant with the Berlinʼs test of the 
compatibility with value-pluralism.
　Tracking the liberal classification back to Berlinʼs theory of liberty, we 
can reach the deeper point to see why liberal theorists intended to classify 
republicanism. Remember why Berlin separated the conception of liberty. 
According to Charles Taylor, Berlin dared to limit negative liberty to the 
“opportunity concept,” without extending it to the “excise concept,” in 
order to eradicate the extreme version of positive liberty. That is, Berlin 
took a strategy of ʻMaginot lineʼ to fight totalitarian menace at the last-ditch 
position, rather than engaging enemies on an open terrain of exercise-
concepts, where one would have to fight to discriminate the good from the 
bad among such concepts.(28) Put differently: Berlin separated the conception 
of liberty because he wanted to stay on a safe and stable position by 
entrenching himself in a fort of negative liberty, filling it only with good 
elements, and fight dangerous enemy of totalitarianism, inflicting the other 
bad elements on the side of positive liberty. Of this conservative and 
distortive strategy Berlin took, we can find out his anxiety or fear for a 
theory of liberty as self-government, say republicanism. And it seems to be 
commonly rooted in an assumption of liberal theorists: republicanism would, 
unless one has vigilant eyes for it, quickly fall down to connect with 
metaphysical monism and deny individual liberties and rights. In order to 
avoid this result, it is necessary to test a validity of republicanism from the 
viewpoint of whether it is compatible with our pluralist world.
　It seems their anxiety or fear that was in the root of the liberal 
classification of republicanism. Liberal theorists like Berlin and Rawls are 
afraid of a denial of value-pluralism, that is, of imposing a particular value 
or end on individuals and making them unable to endorse and pursue their 
own. That is perhaps a motivation that drove liberal theorists to classify 
republicanism: republicans must be rejected out of the liberal framework if 
they regard participation and virtue as the single common good, while they 
　Taylor 1985, pp. 213-214.
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should be accepted if they regard participation and virtue among diverse 
conceptions of the good and respect the constitutional regime which protects 
individual liberties. In this classification, a ʻstrongʼ version is supposed to be 
dangerous, in that it would go beyond the liberal framework, whereas a 
ʻmoderateʼ version is supposed to be safe in that it would be accommodated 
within the framework. Behind this classification is an apprehension that 
republicanism, as long as it has a risky aspect of imposing a single value on 
all, cannot be approved in our pluralist society. In other words, the 
underlying intent of the liberal classification is one that would accommodate 
republicanism within its fromework. By testing republicans, liberal theorists 
try to subordinate them to a condition of our modern world: value-pluralism.
５. Beyond the liberal classification
　Do republicans pass this test and be accommodated well? In the last 
section, I make some comments on the liberal classification to explore this 
point.  
1) ‘strong’ republicans are locked in by the liberal classification
　Among modern republicans, some accept the liberal classification without 
doubt and are willing to admit that they advocate the strong version of 
republicanism. For example, Michel J. Sandel, based on the classification, 
professed that the strong version, not the moderate one, seemed to him 
“the most persuasive.” He said that if one adopts the moderate version, 
self-sacrifice would be reduced to a function of utilitarian calculation as an 
instrument to pursue private ends.(29) Adrian Oldfield also seemed to prefer 
the strong version because he thought, based on a view of the human 
growth, that paternalistic education is needed for “the creation of free and 
autonomous moral being.”(30) They have a joint passion for stressing that 
　“The idea that political participation and civic virtue are important only for the sake 
of maintaining a regime that enables us to pursue our private ends is unlikely to be 
stable. Unless citizens have reason to believe that sharing in self-government is 
intrinsically important, their willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the common 
good may be eroded by instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of 
political participation.” Sandel 1998a, p. 325.
　Oldfield 1990, pp. 152-153.
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civic republicanism is an autonomous position distinct from modern 
liberalism by putting emphasis on the intrinsic importance of participation 
and virtue.
　However, their self-understanding seems locked in by the liberal 
classification: they drive themselves into closing the way to the possible 
revival of civic republicanism in our modern world by putting too much 
emphasis on a role of participation and virtue. It may be necessary to 
promote political participation and foster civic virtue in our modern world, 
but it would be seen, perhaps even from the republican viewpoint, 
unrealistic, or undesirable, to expect normal citizens to devote a full-
hearted self-sacrifice to their community. Pluralist or liberal theorists 
wouldnʼt hesitate to refuse their demand, and instead recommend them to 
be consistent with the pluralist condition of our world: to be modest. The 
self-professed strong republicans, though successfully differentiated their 
position from liberalism, seems to make their own validity suspicious by 
specifying their own position along the liberal classification. They fail the 
specification of their position from the republican viewpoint, which 
otherwise judges the validity of republicanism in our modern world. I will 
be back on this point later in 4).
2) Was Machiavelli moderate?
　It is also problematic that liberal theorists understand Machiavelli as an 
ancestor of the moderate version of republicanism. In fact he wasnʼt so 
pluralist much as Berlin and Rawls thought. As a whole, he gave us an 
impression that he advocated the strong version of republicanism in that he 
accentuated an utility of civic religion and coercive law in order to foster 
virtuous citizens. And an exploration on his argument in more detail would 
prove to demonstrate that his philosophy had many features clearly distinct 
from the liberal understanding. It is well known that he appraised the 
ancient religion, which often used auspice, and hated the Roman Catholic 
Church and its ecclesiastics. He preferred the ancient religion because it 
animated virtus such as a brutality or ferociousness and served to military 
purposes including a triumph of war.(31) And he reproached the Catholic 
Church because it had brought a serious split in Italy and impeded a 
national unity enough to defend against invasions by other countries.(32) We 
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can imagine from his statements that in fact he expected religion to assume 
a role of cultivating virtue in order to unify cities and defend Italy. He 
confronted the ancient religion with Christianity as Berlin described, not 
because he wanted to show these two moral worlds were incompatible, but 
just because he judged the former was more useful in cultivating virtù than 
the latter. If Christianity were useful, he wouldnʼt have hesitated to discard 
the ancient religion and to support the Catholic Church. In this sense, 
Machiavelli was a strong, not moderate, republican who aimed to cultivate 
virtù with a single religion, whether the ancient religion or Christianity. In 
spite of Berlinʼs and Rawlsʼ understanding, he wasnʼt a republican who was 
“one of the makers of pluralism” or did “not presuppose a comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.”
3) Beyond Berlin’s dichotomy
　It is important to note that many modern republicans profess that they 
take the third way beyond Berlinʼs dichotomy, neither negative nor positive 
liberty. According to Skinner and Philip Pettit, liberal theorists have 
interpreted the concept of liberty as ʻnon-interferenceʼ or ʻnon-interventionʼ: 
one is free when he can do what he wants to do without interference by 
others. However, in the republican tradition, one is not supposed to be free 
when he can do anything without interference, because he would lose his 
freedom when he might be intervened. When one is subject to an arbitrary 
intention of the others, just as a slave depends on his masterʼs whim or 
mercy, he cannot be any longer free, even if he isnʼt actually intervened. 
One would lose his freedom when he might be intervened i.e. he is 
dominated. They proclaim that the conception of liberty taken over by civic 
republicans in the long history has been ʻnon-dependenceʼ or ʻnon-
domination.ʼ(33)
　In this context, Skinner and Pettit put the republican conception of 
liberty on neither conception of liberty suggested by Berlin. In their view, 
the republican conception of liberty cannot be reduced to the full-range 
　Machiavelli 1999, p. 494. He exemplified the effects of the religious actions with the 
cases of the Sammnium (ibid., pp. 515-517) or of the consul Papirius (ibid., pp. 511-
514).
　Machiavelli 1986, pp. 292-293.
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meaning of negative liberty as Berlin defined. In his conception, one is free 
as long as he doesnʼt meet with any obstacles in reality. But in the 
republican conception, one would be no longer free when he might be 
intervened by the others, depends on otherʼs arbitrary intention, or is 
dominated. Liberty as non-domination, as republicans understand, has a 
broader meaning than negative liberty.(34) But on the other hand, the 
republican conception of liberty doesnʼt have the full-range meaning of 
positive liberty as Berlin defined. Certainly it takes a step out of a fort of 
negative liberty in that it has a broader meaning than the latter does.(35) 
However, even though republicans have stressed the importance of 
participation and virtue, “the primary focus is clearly on avoiding the evils 
associated with interference,”(36) not on advocating the subordination to 
moral agency. As they stated, republicans may have in fact taken a way to 
positive liberty, but they donʼt presuppose a doctrine that would lead to 
metaphysical monism and totalitarianism as Berlin feared. Liberty as non-
domination isnʼt supposed to have dangerous aspects that Berlin attributed 
to positive liberty.
　“Domination can occur without interference, because it requires only that someone 
have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs; no one need actually interfere.” 
Pettit 1997, p. 23. “What, then, divides the neo-roman from the liberal understanding 
of freedom? What the neo-roman writers repudiate avant la lettre is the key assumption 
of classical liberalism to the effect that force or the coercive threat of it constitute the 
only forms of constraint that interfere with individual liberty. The neo-roman writers 
insist，by contrast, that to live in a condition of dependence is in itself a source and a 
form of constraint. As soon as you recognise that you are living in such a condition, 
this will serve in itself to constrain you from exercising a number of your civil rights. 
This is why they insist, pace Paley, that to live in such a condition is to suffer a 
diminution not merely of security for your liberty but of liberty itself.” Skinner 1998, 
p. 84.
　But republicans donʼt converge on this point. Skinner once stated that the republicans 
have offered simply an “alternative account” of negative liberty, by saying that freedom 
will be lost not only by dependence but also restraint or constraint. See Skinner 1998, 
pp. 82-83. Pettit, on the other side, insists that a person will lose freedom only when 
he is dependent on an arbitrary will of the other, that is, dominated. See, Pettit 2002, 
pp. 339-353.
　“The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs 
something more than the absence of interference; it requires security against interference, 
in particular against interference on a arbitrary basis.” Pettit 1997, p. 51.
　Pettit 1997, p. 27.
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　If that is the case, the republican conception of liberty would transcend 
Berlinʼs dichotomy. It is neither negative nor positive liberty, but is put, as 
it were, between them.(37) According to Pettit, the conception of liberty as 
non-domination, which “fits on neither side of the now established negative-
positive dichotomy” is “a distinctively republican conception, as I believe.”(38)
4) Republican classification of republicanism
　If republicanism is to be classified, it seems more useful to divide it into, 
in place of the strong and moderate version, a cultivating-virtue (CV) and 
participating-deliberation (PD) version. I have argued elsewhere that the 
appropriate republican theory of law in the modern society would be the PD 
rather than CV version.(39) How different is this division from the liberal 
classification? Certainly it shares with the liberal classification an interest to 
see whether or to what extent civic republicanism would have the validity 
in our modern world. Modern republicans would agree with pluralists and 
liberals on the potentiality of civic republicanism to provide a theoretical 
clue for refiguring a public base in the pluralist society. However, it would 
go beyond such an expectation: rather it aims to find a fundamental way to 
overcome the liberal public/private separation and re-consociate the public 
and the private. It will go beyond the liberal classification ― here I pick up 
some remarks on the basic idea from my argumentation.
　Liberal theorists, as often criticized by radical democrats like Chantal 
Mouffe or Sheldon Wolin,(40) tend to undermine the ideal of democracy and 
self-government by entrenching as an immovable given the conception of 
justice and the constitutional regime it specifies and alienating them from 
political engagement of citizens who have their own interests and 
conceptions of the good. This liberal separation of the public and the private 
is, as examined in sect. 3, exemplified in Rawlsʼ differentiation of the 
political conception of justice and comprehensive doctrine: the former is 
　Larmore 2001, p. 233.
　Pettit 1997, p. 51.
　For readers who want to know the detail, see Omori 2006 (though not written in 
English).
　They tend to criticize the liberal theory of justice for impoverishing the political. See 
Mouffe 1993 and Wolin 1996.
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supposed to be “freestanding” of the latter. Certainly the liberal separation 
must be important because it aims to alienate individual liberties and rights 
from turbulent political process and defend private lives against interference 
by the government. However, it is problematic because it forgets that the 
constitutional regime which protects individual liberties and rights was 
created and has been legitimated by democratic deliberation in which 
virtuous citizens take part. In other words, it has a problem of neglecting 
the public legitimacy of the legal framework. It is in this context, I 
suppose, that the retrieval of civic republicanism has attracted much 
attention in these years. Civic republicanism is expected to a philosophical 
approach to restore the ideal of democracy and self-government by 
re-consociate the public and the private, which were once separated within 
the liberal framework.
　Here it is necessary to understand civic republicanism by dividing it into 
two distinct versions. The CV version is set up, on the basis of the 
Aristotelian doctrine, to bring private persons up to public citizens by 
cultivating civic virtue in small communities such as church or township. 
This approach may be characterized by civic education: a direct conversion 
of personality. This is no doubt widely overlapped with the strong version 
of republicanism in the liberal classification, which is supported by Sandel 
and Oldfield. Although it is one of the republican approach to re-consociate 
the public with the private, but it seems inadequate in our modern world. 
Inadequate not because it is inconsistent with the value-pluralism, but 
because it lacks actual democratic channels to construct the public 
framework, through which people can discuss on what kind of conception of 
justice and constitutional institutions should govern our society. It aims to 
bridge only a psychological gap between the public and the private: self-
government would realize only in the minds of allegedly ʻvirtuousʼ citizens.
　On the other hand, the PD version is designed to deliver private voices 
into public institutions by multiplying channels of collective decision-making 
and enlarge forum of dialogue and communication. This approach is 
supported by theorists of deliberative democracy, such as Jürgen Habermas 
or Frank Michelman.(41) It may be characterized by the re-organization of 
the public and the private: a permanent modification through deliberation. 
It enables private persons to have opportunities to make or change public 
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decisions, through taking part in informal spaces, discussing on their 
common affairs, making agreements on them. It aims to multiply and 
enlarge deliberative process ranging from daily lives to formal institutions.
　Then does the PD version correspond to the moderate version in the 
liberal classification? Certainly it is partially overlapped with the moderate 
version in that it endorses a variety of perspectives and opinions which 
participants have and offer in deliberative forum and is willing to count them 
into public decisions. In this sense, it approves value-pluralism ― but 
doesnʼt regard it as a given fact. It expects to mitigate conflicts, if not to 
bring a reconciliation, among values in the deliberation. The PD version 
depends on a capacity of deliberation because of its following consequences: 
giving the participants opportunities to revise their initial preferences or 
naked desires through exchanges of their perspectives, making them 
rethink the property or priority of their diverse conceptions of the good by 
mutual persuasion, or offering them agenda about fundamental issues of 
justice and law.(42) Needless to say, it wonʼt be easy for diverse citizens to 
make an agreement on public issues in our pluralist society. But the PD 
version of republicanism, even if an unanimous resolution is ultimately 
impossible, will never give up a hope that diverse citizens can cooperatively 
decide on their common affairs by themselves: a dream of self-government.
　Perhaps from the Berlinʼs and other liberalsʼ like Rawlsʼ viewpoint, even 
the PD version, not to mention the CV version, would be inacceptable as 
the moderate version of republicanism in the pluralist society. Inacceptable 
because they would think that it will try to overcome value-pluralism, not 
to accept it as a given fact. However, republican theorists of law, with 
deliberative democracy, will go beyond the liberal framework.
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